The Current #11
by Hunter WorlandFeb 20, 2025
Mega-caps like the Magnificent Seven have (rightfully) cast long shadows over the 2024 market narrative given their remarkable performance and $15+ trillion in combined market cap. As 2025 kicks off, they'll have to share the spotlight with a new cast of characters - the anticipated wave of venture-backed IPOs waiting in the wings. Yet between the mega-caps and the coming IPO debuts lies another informative set of stories. Before our feeds flood with S-1 teardowns and growth metrics, here's a tour of insights from public companies from Kazakhstan to Silicon Valley that the early-stage ecosystem shouldn't overlook.
Most readers likely don't think about Kazakhstan often (... or ever). I can’t blame them. Its economy is equal to South Carolina's. Its trading relationships are focused in Central Asia and Russia. Yet its tech darling, Kaspi, is a fantastic case study on how market depth can compensate for breadth.
There are super apps. And then there’s Kaspi. The platform includes consumer banking, merchant banking, e-com, BNPL, e-grocery, P2P payments, travel, even maps. It might better be described as a national operating system with 90% of the adult population being a monthly active user. Going so deep in a small market (by Silicon Valley standards) has not impeded the company’s scale. In Q3 of 2024, Kaspi drove about $1.26b in revenue (28% year-over-year growth for a company over fifteen years old) according to the company’s quarterly presentation. For scale, US-based marketplace Instacart reported $852 million with less than half the growth rate. Or, their scale, put differently: Kapsi’s revenue, as a share of local GDP, is higher than Walmart’s in the United States. Even more astounding, marketplace GMV is nearly 5% of Kazak GDP.
Each product line reinforces the others: marketplace drives payment volume, payments enable lending data, and lending encourages marketplace purchases. For the early-stage ecosystem, Kaspi is a reminder that market size is the function of multiple variables. A small absolute consumer pool can be compensated by depth and a flywheel of complementary products.
Affirm has squarely demonstrated that Buy Now Pay Later (BNPL) was not merely a ZIRP phenomenon. An evolving macro has not stopped the performance of the business. In Q4, Affirm reported $7.2b in GMV, $659mm in revenue – 31% and 48% year-on-year growth respectively. For early stage companies this isn't just about BNPL, but rather opening the door to a broader disruption of the decades-old credit card rewards model. More concretely, Affirm demonstrates that consumers and merchants are ready to embrace payment paradigms that diverge from traditional card economics, where interchange fees and revolving balances subsidize points and cash-back programs. This opens opportunities for startups building on new payment rails or serving Gen Z consumers who approach credit differently than previous generations.
The tale of two D2C brands: Allbirds and Chewy. Founded within three years of each other, they IPOed at $2.1b and $8.7b respectively. Today, Allbirds has a market cap of under $100mm. While Chewy, despite multiple compression from 2021-highs, has defended a $16b market cap, a customer base of 20 million, and over $11b in sales in 2024 FY, mostly from subscriptions. Where other D2C companies struggled to maintain a sustainable CAC and retention with scale, Chewy's cohorts increased spend over time through natural category expansion.
Rather than relying on brand marketing and paid acquisition to drive one-time purchases, Chewy built around the inherent recurring needs of pet ownership. This foundation enabled systematic expansion into high-margin adjacencies: sponsored ads, healthcare services , and veterinary care. Their mobile app confers higher AOVs and retention rates compared to traditional D2C apps focused on discovery and conversion.
For early-stage founders and investors, Chewy demonstrates how categories with high emotional investment (just ask any pet owner) and natural purchase frequency can create superior unit economics. The key isn't just finding passionate customers - it's building in spaces where that passion naturally translates into recurring revenue and expansion opportunities.
Professional networks are giants hiding in plain sight. And the market is ripe for new entrants. How its two largest players are structured partially obscures its scale. Everyone knows LinkedIn, but its parent company Microsoft masks its size. The company rarely breaks out detailed segment financials or user metrics in investor presentations. Even if it did, the product lines of the world’s first to third largest company (depending on the day) would overshadow its performance.
The second giant, Recruit Holdings - parent of Indeed and Glassdoor - generates approximately $23b in annualized revenue and $4.5b in adjusted EBITDA, per investor materials. For context, that's more revenue than Intuit, Spotify, or Airbnb. Yet, Recruit is not a household name (whether because of its anonymous HoldCo name, because the company trades in Tokyo rather than New York, or another reason is beyond my scope).
The opportunity to unpack incumbents, if just by enterprise value at stake, seems as gigantic as other consumer categories that have attracted more venture attention. The emergence of generative AI only amplifies this opportunity. The technical scaffolding now exists for early stage founders to reimagine core workflows across the hiring journey: from intelligent candidate-employer matching and automated resume tailoring, to AI agents that proactively surface and apply to relevant positions.
What did I miss? Email me at hworland@nea.com to continue the conversation.
Notes & Sources
Market valuation of Magnificent Seven includes Alphabet (GOOGL), Amazon.com (AMZN), Apple (AAPL), Meta Platforms (META), Microsoft (MSFT), Nvidia (NVDA) and Tesla (TSLA) as of Feb 2, 2025; Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measured by the Worldbank and Bureau of Economic Analysis; Earnings from Recruit and Kaspi converted to USD at spot rate at time of writing; Affirm GMV applies latest share of revenue from the United States (97%) on reported GMV figures from quarterly earnings; all market capitalizations are provided by Factset and last updated on Feb 2, 2025
Sources: Kaspi 3Q 2024 Financial Statement (2024); Instacart Third Quarter 2024 Shareholder Letter (2024); Affirm Q4 2024 Earnings Supplement (2024); Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales Report by the United States Census (2024); Chewy Q3 2024 Earnings Presentation (2024); Recruit Holdings Presentation Slides of Results Presentation Video for Q3FY2024 (2024)
Disclaimer
The information provided in this blog post is for educational and informational purposes only and is not intended to be investment advice, or recommendation, or as an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy an interest in any fund or investment vehicle managed by NEA or any other NEA entity. New Enterprise Associates (NEA) is a registered investment adviser with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). However, nothing in this post should be interpreted to suggest that the SEC has endorsed or approved the contents of this post. NEA has no obligation to update, modify, or amend the contents of this post nor to notify readers in the event that any information, opinion, forecast or estimate changes or subsequently becomes inaccurate or outdated. In addition, certain information contained herein has been obtained from third-party sources and has not been independently verified by NEA. Any statements made by founders, investors, portfolio companies, or others in the post or on other third-party websites referencing this post are their own, and are not intended to be an endorsement of the investment advisory services offered by NEA.
NEA makes no assurance that investment results obtained historically can be obtained in the future, or that any investments managed by NEA will be profitable. To the extent the content in this post discusses hypotheticals, projections, or forecasts to illustrate a view, such views may not have been verified or adopted by NEA, nor has NEA tested the validity of the assumptions that underlie such opinions. Readers of the information contained herein should consult their own legal, tax, and financial advisers because the contents are not intended by NEA to be used as part of the investment decision making process related to any investment managed by NEA.